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Recent Developments 
DAVIS v. SLATER: 
Maryland Statutory Law Does Not Divest Parties in Civil Cases of 
Their Common Law Entitlement to Jury Trial Where the Amount in 
Controversy Fails to Exceed Ten Thousand Dollars 
By: Nathaniel Kenneth Risch 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that Maryland 
statutory law does not divest parties in civil cases of their common law 
entitlement to jury trial where the amount in controversy fails to 
exceed ten thousand dollars. Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 602, 861 
A.2d 78, 79 (2004). Because the General Assembly failed to expressly 
limit the entitlement to a trial by jury in regard to the amount in 
controversy, the common law rule dictates that any party with a proper 
civil claim in the circuit court is entitled to a jury trial. /d. at 621-22, 
861 A.2d at 91. 
On July 26, 1999, Patricia Ann Slater ("Slater") collided with 
Jimmy L. Davis ("Davis") while driving in Baltimore County. Davis 
suffered injuries and an ambulanc.e transported him to Bay View 
Hospital. 
On May 29, 2001, Davis filed a Complaint in the District Court 
of Maryland for Baltimore County requesting twenty-five thousand 
dollars in damages and expenses. Slater filed a timely answer and 
requested a jury trial pursuant to § 4-402(e)(1) of the Courts and 
Judicial Proceedings Article (§ 4-402(e)(1)). The district court 
subsequently transferred the action to the Circuit Court for Baltimore 
County. 
On February 11, 2003, following eighteen months of 
discovery, Davis filed an amended complaint in which he reduced his 
ad damnum demand to ten thousand dollars. Davis filed a Motion to 
Strike Jury Demand and a Request for Hearing, relying again on § 4-
402(e)(1) and Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The 
circuit court denied Davis's Motion to Strike Jury Demand on three 
occasions and the jury awarded Davis only $727.03. Davis appealed 
to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, but Court of Appeals 
issued a writ of certiorari on its own motion to address whether the 
circuit court erred in allowing Davis's claim for ten thousand dollars to 
be heard by a jury. 
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Davis contended that the right to jury trial is triggered by an 
amount in controversy exceeding ten thousand dollars. !d. at 81, 861 
A.2d at 605. He argued that the language of Article 23 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights divested Slater of her right to jury trial 
when Davis reduced his ad damnum clause to that amount. !d. at 617-
18, 861 A.2d at 89. Article 23 provides that the right to jury trial, 
"where the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000, shall be inviolably 
preserved." !d. at 603, 861 A.2d at 80. Davis also posited that the 
General Assembly acted to annul the common law entitlement to trial 
by jury by enacting § 4-402(e)(1), which states that a party may 
demand a jury trial when the amount in controversy exceeds ten 
thousand dollars. !d. at 615, 861 A.2d at 87. 
Slater countered by stating that Articles 5 and 23 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights, when read in tandem, guarantee the 
right to jury trial in civil cases where the amount in controversy 
exceeds ten thousand dollars without abrogating the entitlement for 
suits worth ten thousand dollars or less. !d. at 606, 861 A.2d at 82. 
More specifically, Article 5(a) provides that residents of Maryland 
"are entitled to the Common Law of England, and trial by Jury, 
according to the course of that law." !d. at 606, 861 A.2d at 82. Slater 
also asserted that Maryland Rule 2-325(t) prohibits one party from 
unilaterally divesting another party of the right to jury trial where the 
election was proper. !d. at 607, 861 A.2d at 82-83. 
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by reviewing the 
histories of Articles 5(a) and 23, noting while the Constitutional 
provisions guaranteeing a trial by jury are unassailable by acts of the 
legislature, common law rights may be modified by legislative fiat. !d. 
at 609-14, 861 A.2d at 83-87. The Court of Appeals previously held 
that the General Assembly may exercise its ability to alter common 
law restrictions, though "'statutes are not presumed to make any 
alterations in the common law further than is expressly declared'." !d. 
at 615-16, 861 A.2d at 87 (quoting Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 
A. 354, 356 (1934)). The court reasoned, contrary to Davis's 
assertion, that § 4-402(e)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
Article does not contain evidence in its language or legislative history 
indicating support for the abrogation of the common law right to jury. 
!d. at 616, 861 A.2d at 88. 
In addition, Davis contended that the General Assembly 
changed the common law by repeatedly raising the minimum amount 
in controversy in Article 23 from five dollars in 1850 to the current 
minimum of ten thousand dollars. !d. at 616-18, 861 A.2d at 88-89. 
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The Court of Appeals interpreted that the intent of ra1smg the 
jurisdictional minimum was not to limit the right to trial by jury but to 
ensure that the right will be "inviolably preserved" when the amount in 
controversy is met. !d. at 618, 861 A.2d at 89 (quoting MD. DECL. OF 
RIGHTS, Art. 23). Thus, the Court of Appeals determined that the 
General Assembly failed to limit the right to jury trial to those cases 
where the amount in controversy exceeds ten thousand dollars. !d. at 
620, 861 A.2d at 90. 
Because Davis's amendment of the ad damnum clause to ten 
thousand dollars failed to divest Slater of her right to a jury trial, 
Davis's Motion to Strike Jury Demand was subject to Maryland Rule 
2-325(f). !d. at 620, 861 A.2d at 90. Maryland Rule 2-325(f) provides 
that an election for trial by jury may only be withdrawn with the 
consent of all parties not in default. !d. at 603, 861 A.2d at 80 n. 3 
(emphasis added). Furthermore, as a result ofDavis's failure to gamer 
the required consent of Slater when submitting the Motion to Strike 
Demand, the Court of Appeals held the circuit court properly denied 
the motion. !d. at 620, 861 A.2d at 90. 
The Court of Appeals declined to address whether the right to 
demand a jury trial exists in small claims cases because small claims 
court has limited discovery, informal proceedings, and the amount in 
controversy in this case exceeded the jurisdictional limit of small 
claims court. !d. at 614, 861 A.2d at 87 n. 10. Though not an issue 
presented by the parties, the Court of Appeals discussed why 
jurisdiction remained with the circuit court. !d. at 620, 861 A.2d at 90 
n. 15. It explained that the district court divested jurisdiction to the 
circuit court upon Slater's successful demand for a jury trial and 
jurisdiction remained with the circuit court when the court affirmed the 
entitlement to a jury trial. I d. at 620, 861 A.2d at 90 n. 15. Under 
Maryland Rule 2-327(2), Davis needed consent and a waiver of any 
entitlement to a jury trial to transfer the case back to district court. !d. 
at 620, 861 A.2d at 90 n. 15. 
While balancing the preservation of the constitutional right to 
jury trial and the need to regulate that entitlement in order to 
administer justice, the Court of Appeals reinforced the importance of 
the entitlement. Without opening the floodgates to potential requests 
for jury trials in courts of limited jurisdiction, any party in a case heard 
before a court of general jurisdiction may now request a trial before a 
jury of the party's peers. 
Thus, if a party in a civil suit desires a jury trial and can have 
the case heard in a court of general jurisdiction under the Maryland 
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Rules, the court must grant her the jury trial and the requesting party 
will retain the entitlement regardless of the amount in controversy. 
Any party in a civil suit brought before a Maryland circuit court may 
claim that the right to jury trial is unhindered by the Maryland 
Legislature. 
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